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PART ONE: CLIENT BRIEF 
Project organization 
This project comes in five parts: 
1. Client brief: The client brief is an executive summary. It is for North Carolina Retirement 
Systems policy staff and assumes the reader knows the background. I focus on the policy 
question, results, and how the results are relevant to the retirement system. 
 
2. Academic brief: This section gives background information and includes details about the 
dataset and methods. This section is primarily for the sake of being thorough and to meet 
the academic requirements of this project. It might be a tedious section for someone who 
already knows the subject or who is not interested in the particulars of how I got my results. 
 
3. Appendix one, results tables: Appendix one has tables of regression results to which I refer 
throughout the paper. 
 
4. Appendix two, statistical concepts and equations: I give a short overview of the fundamental 
statistical concepts of least squares regression and survival analysis. This section is written 
to be transparent about the methods and equations I used, even if they are standard 
practice. It was also a good exercise for me to think carefully whether the base assumptions 
of my models held or not. I go through those assumptions briefly and relate them to this 
project. I walk through a proof of the validity of least-squares regression when those 
assumptions hold. In other words, I try to show in math and in words why someone could 
believe the results mean anything. I include relevant likelihood functions and some 
important equations I use to calculate results. For specifics on all calculations, look in 
appendix three. 
 
5. Appendix three, code for R software: In the spirit of giving retirement system staff useful 
work, I did all analyses using the free and widely used R statistical software. In appendix 
three, I include all code so the client’s staff members can reproduce and improve upon my 
work, if they want to. Providing the code also allows the client to update this analysis as 
more and better data become available. 
 
Purpose 
Retirement system staff are in the midst of contemplating changes to policies limiting work in 
retirement for members of the Local Governmental Employees’ Retirement System (LGERS) and the 
Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System (TSERS). Until recently, the retirement system 
had no comprehensive data about how many of its retirees return to work, when, for how long, and 
how much they earn in doing so.  
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The project analyzes a new dataset including that information for all LGERS1 and TSERS2 retirees 
who worked in retirement -- from Jan. 1, 2007 to Dec. 31, 2013 -- for employers in the same 
systems from which they retired, while continuing to receive their retirement benefits. 
I try to answer two questions as best I can: 
1. Which characteristics, if any, suggest retirees in the dataset were willing to work for less in 
retirement, holding constant pre-retirement compensation and other factors? 
 
2. Which characteristics influenced how long those retirees worked? 
 
Relevance to retirement system policy 
This paper is intended to give retirement system staff a better understanding of the population of 
retirees who choose to work for employers within their former systems, while continuing to receive 
benefits. My results have implications for a number of different policies the retirement system is 
considering. But I do not try to come up with a solution to a particular problem.  
I also do not try to predict how retirees would behave after a particular policy change, or even how 
they will behave after Dec. 31, 2013. Those are different questions and require a different approach, 
though this analysis would make for a good starting point. If retirement system staff have reason to 
believe retirees’ past behavior will be similar to their future behavior, my results could be helpful in 
thinking about what might happen after a change. But again, I did not try to predict how retirees 
would behave under new circumstances, and this paper should not be read as such. 
Instead, my goal is to contribute valuable information to process of developing policies related to 
retirees who return to work. With that in mind, I include all code and a discussion of all underlying 
assumptions of the analysis in appendices, for retirement staff to apply to future policy questions if 
they want to. 
The two questions have different policy implications, described in turn below. 
Question One: Earnings in retirement 
I have worked almost a year, part time, as a policy analyst for the retirement system. Throughout 
the year, retirement staff members have begun to develop short- and long-term policy changes 
related to retirees who return to work within the systems from which they retired. Among the 
options retirement staff have considered or could consider are policies to lift restrictions on how 
much retirees can work for employers within the system from which they receive benefits, and how 
much they can earn while doing so.  
                                                          
1 Local Governmental Employees’ Retirement System 
2 Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System 
3 
 
The issue of easing retiree work restrictions is rooted in specific cases retirement staff have dealt 
with and in general demographic trends of recent years: Retirees are living longer, working longer, 
and polls suggest more retirees are interested in leaving work in stages, rather than all at once. 
Such policies often have an actuarial cost for the retirement systems. If there were no limits on 
work in retirement, retirees receiving benefits could fill positions that contributing employees 
otherwise would fill. One solution to offset the actuarial cost of any type of return-to-work policy 
change would be to charge public employers a percentage of the retiree’s earnings, as the systems 
do for active employees. But the offset would have consequences: Employers might oppose the idea, 
making the policy change difficult to achieve. Employers could pay retirees less to accommodate the 
surcharge, but if retirees are unwilling to work for a lower wage it would blunt the effect of 
loosening work restrictions. 
It is possible retirees are willing to work for less the more they receive in retirement benefits. If 
that were the case, state and local governments might be able to hire from the experienced pool of 
retirees at a relative bargain. State policy in previous years, for example, allowed retired teachers in 
North Carolina public schools to work with fewer restrictions, with the goal of helping to meet 
educational workforce needs. The retirement system and public schools might be interested to 
know whether retired teachers on average were willing to work for less in retirement than they did 
at the peak of their careers.  
In general, if certain retirees are willing to work for less, it suggests a policy to remove work 
restrictions and impose a surcharge is more feasible and might have a greater effect on public-
sector human resources than it would if the surcharge limited work opportunities for retirees. 
Question Two: Length of work in retirement 
This question is more generic than the first but it nonetheless gives valuable context to policy 
discussions about changes to policies for retirees who return to work. The retirement system now 
has largely anecdotal information about what types of retirees work most while continuing to 
receive their benefits.  Survival analysis estimates factors influencing lengths of time before a 
certain event, in this case the length of work in retirement before quitting. The system’s new 
comprehensive dataset allows me to estimate relationships among retiree characteristics and how 
long they work.  
For example, I estimate whether retirees who work in public schools on average work longer than 
retirees who work for other public employers, controlling for other factors such as benefit amount, 
income and economic factors. With that information, the retirement system has a better sense of 
how potential changes to return-to-work policy could affect different types of retirees. 
 
Results 
A summary of results and my interpretation of what the results could mean for retirement system 
policy are below. More detail is in the academic brief.  
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Measures of earnings and length of work 
The measure of earnings reported below is a retiree’s total earnings in the dataset divided by the 
number of weeks he or she worked. Earnings are in 2013 dollars, adjusted using the GDP implicit 
price deflator. 
Length of work in retirement is the number of weeks, including parts of weeks, between a person’s 
first date of the first pay period of work in retirement and the last date of the last pay period. 
Important note about results 
Since the three North Carolina retirement systems in this dataset are defined benefit plans, a 
person’s retirement allowance is a product of years of service, average final compensation, and a 
small constant factor of around 0.0185. That factor depends on the retirement system and has 
changed little over the years. 
Since final compensation is controlled for in the regression for my first question, another way to 
interpret the effect of benefit amount is that it captures the effect of years of service as member of 
the retirement system. I stick with the benefit variable because I did not have years of service in the 
dataset and chose not to include a proxy variable for it in my final models. I did not want it to 
appear that I was fabricating data. I did create a proxy variable for years of service and included it 
in the two final models, replacing compensation and benefit, to see how much that mattered. It 
didn’t, much, but that is not surprising because it is just one of the replaced variables times the 
other. The proxy is not an exact measure of years of service because employees who do not reach a 
threshold amount of service has reduced benefits, so the benefit amount follows a slightly different 
formula. Full results are in appendix one. 
You could choose to think of the results below as capturing the effect of years of service, as opposed 
to benefit amount. The important points to remember are that: 1) You can’t separate the effect of 
years of service as opposed to benefit on earnings in this analysis. 2) Not having years of service in 
the regression does not necessarily bias the results, because information about years of service is 
embedded in the variable for benefit, with little additional random effects after controlling for final 
compensation. It would be better, however, if the retirement system were to include the actual 
measure of years of service in the model. The difference between my proxy variable and actual 
years of service would come from individuals who retired with reduced benefits. 
In the spirit of making a useful contribution to the retirement system’s ongoing policy process for 
this subject, I include all software code I used to get these results in an appendix. If the retirement 
system added years of service to its dataset, or any other variables, it could re-run the analysis 
without too much effort.   
Results: Earnings in Retirement 
My results suggest that, on average, retirees were willing to work for a little less the more they 
received in benefits, controlling for compensation at retirement and other factors. Again, you could 
interpret that to mean retirees with more years of service were willing to work for less in 
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retirement. See the note above. However, in one of the two final models I found the opposite 
relationship for retirees who returned to work in public schools. 
Controlling for the other factors in the model, I estimated: 
 Retirees who work for their former systems while continuing to earn their benefits do seem 
willing to work for less, as their benefits get larger. 
 For example: A 1-percent increase in weekly benefit amount at return to work  was related 
to an 0.08 percent decrease in earnings during retirement, for non-school, non-exempt 
retirees with average fitted values and average benefit amounts. Again, that holds constant 
a person’s pre-retirement compensation. 
 Retirees with higher pre-retirement compensation I estimated to have higher earnings 
when they returned to work, holding constant all other factors, which makes sense. 
 For non-exempt school employees, I estimated the relationship between earnings and 
benefit amount to be positive in one model. See below for details. 
 In the model that allowed the effect of benefit amount on earnings to be different depending 
on the size of the benefit, the effect grew stronger for retirees with larger benefits. 
I report estimated effects of retirement benefit amount on earnings in terms of elasticities: The 
percent change in the dependent variable you would expect to see from a one-percent change in the 
benefit amount at return to work, controlling for all other factors in the model. Since I am ultimately 
interested in earnings, not its logarithm, I first transform to logged dependent variable into its fitted 
un-logged form. See appendix two for details. In the paragraphs below I call unlogged earnings the 
“fitted value”. 
Results below come from two models. In model five, I included benefit amount as a squared 
variable, in model one I did not.  Including benefit as a quadratic function allows the change in 
earnings from a unit change in benefit amount to be different depending on how much a person 
makes. I included both results because both made it through the series of criteria I set up to 
evaluate the models. The two models both estimate that earnings in retirement decrease as 
retirement benefit increases for non-school, non-exempt retirees. The models differ in their 
estimated effects for retirees who fall into those groups. It made no sense to evaluate earnings for 
retirees who were exempt from the earnings limit but did not work in schools, since only a handful 
fell into that category. 
The table below reports elasticities from models one and five. Since both models included 
interaction terms with 0-1 indicator variables for retirees working in schools, the effect of benefit 












Model Means 25th pctl 75th pctl 99th pctl Means Means  
Linear (1) -0.08152 NA NA NA -0.08078 -0.08222  
Quadratic (5) -0.03301 -0.00247 -0.07231 -0.38146 0.040773 0.030832  
Full regression results for both models are in appendix one. The important difference between the models is 
that model one has no exponential variables: The relationship is a straight line. Model five has benefit amount 
included as a quadratic. See the second part of this paper for details. 
 
Model one in the first graph instead shows a slightly downward sloping line. Model two in the 
second graph illustrates how the quadratic model characterizes the relationship between benefit 
amount and earnings in retirement. Note that the graphs do not give the same numbers as the ones 
in the table above. The table above gives percent changes for percent changes. The graphs below 
give the expected unit change in logged earnings for a unit change in benefit. I include the show 









Implications: Earnings in Retirement 
As I said above, one of the most common policy options to offset costs related to easing work 
restrictions for retirees is to impose a surcharge for employers on the value of a retiree’s earnings. 
These results suggest such a policy could be workable for retirees with larger benefit amounts. The 
results also suggest it might be worth considering valuing the surcharge based on a worker’s 
retirement benefit, as opposed their earnings. Rehired retirees with larger benefits would 
ultimately earn less under that kind of policy, since employers likely would incorporate the cost of 
the surcharge into the wages they offer. But if they are willing to work for less, retirees might not be 
turned off by the lower wages. 
One of my estimates suggests there is the opposite effect for retirees who worked in schools. For 
those employees, one model estimated earnings in retirement increased as benefits increased. An 
explanation might be that teachers with long experience could be in high demand, allowing them to 
command higher wages when they return to work. 
Limitations: Earnings in Retirement 
This is not a prediction of what could happen after a particular policy change. For example, if there 
were large numbers of retirees who decided not to return to work for public employers because of 
restrictions on how much they can earn or how many hours they can work, results above probably 
would not hold after those restrictions were lifted. That doesn’t have to be the case, though. Most 
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people in the sample had earnings well below the limit, which could mean retirees are only 
interested in earning and working a little in retirement anyway. As a result, their behavior might 
not change much from what it has been over the past five years if the policy were to change. In that 
case, the relationships between earnings and benefit amount could stay more or less the same. 
I should also be clear that my data do not include information on retirees who retire then leave 
retirement, and stop receiving retirement benefits, to become full-time employees and contributing 
members of the system. Data also do not include retirees who continue receiving retirement 
benefits but work in any capacity for private employers. Therefore I can make no inferences about 
retirees who return to work in general. 
I also do not try to predict how much retirees will earn when they return to work, even if 
circumstances do not change. Prediction is a slightly different kind of analysis and has a different 
process with different criteria. Variances for the predicted values are different from the variances in 
the estimated effects. Prediction also comes with more uncertainty, particularly if you are trying to 
predict what might happen after a policy change that has never before happened. Still, in the case of 
linear regression, the process I used and a predictive analysis would be similar. For example, the 
estimated coefficients from this model together with the data could create the so-called best linear 
unbiased predictor of the dependent variable.3 
 
Results: Length of time in work 
Full results tables are in appendix one. The intuitive interpretation of the results is in terms of 
acceleration factors – the proportion by which retirees’ expected probability of working a certain 
amount of time grows or shrinks based on their characteristics. If a variable’s acceleration factor is 
greater than one, the length of time a person works is estimated to increase when that variable 
increases. If the factor is less than one, the length of time a person works is estimated to decrease. 4 
Estimated acceleration factors are below, where the “+ #” terms show the increase in the 
dependent variable used to calculate the acceleration factor. The bullet points following the chart 
explain the variables, and the academic brief has more information.  
For example, you would read the table to mean that an increase of $10 billion5 in private-sector 
state economic output in the year a person returns to work is estimated to reduce the time a person 
is expected by a factor of 0.73. So if a person had a 50-50 chance of working one year before 
quitting, that person is estimated to have a 50-50 chance of working about three-quarters of a year 
before quitting when economic output is $10 billion higher. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Amemiya, T, Advanced Econometrics, 1985, p 39 
4 Kleinbaum and Klein, p 298 
5 In constant, 2013 dollars. See the description of variables in the academic brief. 
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Variable Acceleration Factor Estimate 
ln_diff +0.22  1.013889585 
school  2.431862558 
tsers  0.437434483 
unc  2.60429882 
comcol  2.415769925 
sp500.lag1 +10  0.986351574 
priv_gsp.B +10 6 0.725654147 
gov_gsp.B +10 7 1.200688737 
rtwlag + 1yr  0.99530679 
post09_rtwbegin 8 0.575566766 
socsec_any  0.843742198 
 
I did not include factors for coefficients that were not significantly different from zero. See appendix 
one for the full results. 
The results make common sense, and I interpret them this way: 
 A larger ratio of earnings in retirement to compensation before retirement (ln_diff)9 
extends the time a person works in retirement, controlling for the other factors. 
 Retirees who worked in schools could be expected to work two and a half times longer than 
those who did not work in schools. Working at a university or community college had a 
similar effect. 
 Retirees from TSERS who were not university (unc), school, or community college (comcol) 
employees could be expected to work only half the time an LGERS retiree works. 
 More economic activity in the private sector is related to shorter work times. One 
explanation might be that retirees or their spouses are able to find better-paying work in 
the private sector when private sector output is higher, pulling them away from work for 
public employees. 
 Retirees who started working Jan. 1, 2010 or later could be expected to work just about half 
the time of employees who started working before then, all else equal. That effect is 
estimated while controlling for the fact that some retirees before 2010 were exempt from 
the earnings limit. 
 Being eligible for social security benefits (socsec_any) also shortened the time a retiree 
might be expected to work, though since age itself is not controlled for in this model it’s 
unclear whether that effect is because of age or because of social security benefits 
themselves. 
                                                          
6 Private-sector gross state product at year of return to work in billions of 2013 dollars 
7 Government-sector gross state product at year of return to work  in billions of 2013 dollars 
8 0-1 indicator equal to one if a person returned to work Jan. 1, 2010 or later. Effect is for those with the indicator 
equal to one. 
9 The variable is the natural log of the ratio, but an increase in the log means an increase in the unlogged ratio. 
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Limitations: Earnings in retirement 
Important tests of the survival analysis assumptions fail for the small group of retirees who work 
for less than a month or so. See the academic brief for more detail on that important limitation. So 
the results probably do not do a good job describing factors influencing how long those individuals 
work in retirement. The same is true for school employees who were exempt from the earnings 
limit. Therefore I do not include an acceleration factor for that group in the results above.  
The question is whether those aberrations bias the results for other groups. I re-estimated the 
model twice, once without retirees who were exempt from the earnings and limit and who were not 
school employees, and again without retirees who worked less than a month before quitting. 






















PART TWO: ACADEMIC BRIEF 
 
Background 
Returning to Work After Retirement 
Recent polls and demographic trends show retirees are living longer, working longer and retiring 
later than they did decades ago. Life expectancy at birth increased 13 percent - 69.7 years to 78.7 
years - from 1960 to 2010.10 Life expectancy at age 65 increased 34 percent in that time, from 14.3 
years to 19.1 years.11 Such demographic changes have broad implications for retirement policy.  
According to Gallup polls, the expected retirement ages among active workers in 2012 was 67 years, 
on average, compared to an expected retirement age of 60 years in 1996.12Separate Gallup polls 
showed respondents reported actual average retirement age of 61 years in 2013, compared to an 
average retirement age of 57 years in 1991.13 Retirement ages in TSERS have followed a similar 
trend, with the average retirement age reaching 62 in 2012.14 
Perhaps as a result of those demographic changes, reentering the workforce after retirement is 
common. One study estimated that about 60 percent of older workers from 1992-2002 left full-time 
jobs for less-than-full-time jobs, so-called “bridge jobs,” before leaving the labor market.15 A study 
published in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Review found that roughly 15 percent of 
Americans who left the workforce came back to work after four or more years.16 Older workers’ 
fluid approach to retirement sometimes clashes with pension plan policies, which are designed to 
secure income for workers who leave the labor force altogether.17 
 
 
                                                          
10 Life expectancy at birth, at age 65, and at age 75, by sex, race, and Hispanic origin: United States, selected 
years 1900-2010, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
11 Ibid 
12 Expected Retirement Age in U.S. up to 67, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/154178/expected-
retirement-age.aspx, retrieved May 23, 2013 
13 In U.S., Average Retirement Age up to 61, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/162560/average-
retirement-age.aspx, retrieved Oct. 31, 2013 
14 Retirement Security for N.C. Teachers and State Employees, Presentation, N.C. Department of State 
Treasurer, May 6, 2013 
15 Cahill, Geandria, and Quinn, “Retirement Patters from Career Employment,” The Gerontologist, April 2006. 
http://gerontologist.oxfordjournals.org/content/46/4/514.full 
16 Cahill, Giandrea, and Quinn, “Reentering the Labor Force After Retirement,” Monthly Labor Review, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, June 2011. http://blsweb1.psb.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2011/06/art2full.pdf 
17 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-1(b)(1), “In order for a pension plan to be a qualified plan under section 401(a), the plan 
must be established and maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically for the payment of 
definitely determinable benefits to its employees over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement or 
attainment of normal retirement age.” 
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Defined-Benefit Pension Plans 
Defined-benefit pension plans offer plan members a monthly benefit after retirement. Benefit 
amounts typically are defined using a formula based on years of service with an employer in the 
plan and on salary earned leading up to retirement.18 
Participants in defined-benefit pension plans make tax-free contributions toward retirement, as do 
their employers.19 Investment earnings for pension plan trusts are also untaxed. To qualify for 
special tax treatment, pension plans must qualify under Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a) and 
all related Internal Revenue Service laws and rules. 
Policies to Restrict Work During Retirement 
To meet federal and state requirements, defined-benefit pension plans place a number of 
restrictions on reemployment for retirees receiving pension checks. Restrictions typically include 
limits on earnings and full-time employment, as well as a requirement to wait a period of time 
before becoming reemployed. Typically, restrictions only apply to work with an employer 
participating in the same retirement system from which the retiree is receiving benefits. For 
example, a retiree from TSERS who returned to work for a state agency would be subject to an 
earnings restriction. If the retirees had returned to work for a private-sector employer, the earnings 
limitation might apply if the person were to work directly for the state agency through a third-party 
contract. But in most cases the earnings limitation would not apply to a retiree working for an 
employer that does not participate in TSERS.  
Policies to restrict employment for retirees with pension benefits exist for two reasons:  
1. Internal Revenue Service laws, regulations and rulings require retirement systems 
qualified under Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a) to distribute retirement benefits only 
after a retiree has separated from service or after the retiree has reached normal retirement 
age.20 
2. Retirement systems lose a source of revenue when retirees receiving a pension 
benefits take the places of non-retired employees who would have contributed to the 
system. To limit losses to retirement funds, some systems require employers or rehired 
retirees or both to contribute to the system while the retirees are employed. 
Consequences are potentially severe for a retirement system that fails to follow IRS requirements 
under IRC Section 401(a). Disqualified plan trusts, employers and employees lose all tax-preferred 
                                                          
18 Definitions, Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-
Employee/Definitions, retrieved 10/31/13 
19 Retirement Topics - Contributions, Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-
Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Topics-Contributions, retrieved 10/31/13 
20 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-1(b); Revenue Ruling 56-693, 1956-2 C.B. 282, as modified by Revenue Ruling 60-323, 1960-2 
C.B. 148; Letter to N.C. Retirement Systems Director Discussing General Requirements Regarding Distributions 
from a Qualified Benefit Plan, Schmieder, D., Buck Consultants, 2001 
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treatment, and the IRS could assess penalties to a plan worth as much as the total foregone tax 
liability for contributions and earnings.21 22 
Consequences for retirees who violate return-to-work policies are also harsh. Typically, pension 
plans recoup all or part of retirement benefits paid after the date at which payments should have 
stopped because of a return-to-work violation. State employee defined-benefit pension systems 
interpret IRS requirements differently and have developed varied approaches to regulating 
reemployment for retirees. 
Retirement and Return-to-Work Policies in TSERS 
None of North Carolina’s defined-benefit retirement plans has a normal retirement age, and most 
do not allow for the distribution of retirement benefits before a separation from service. The 
phased retirement program for public university employees is the one exception.  
To receive full retirement benefits, TSERS members must have at least 30 years of service as state 
employees, implying a minimum possible retirement age of 48 years.23 In 1973, the state legislature 
removed a minimum retirement age for TSERS of 62 and replaced it with the current 30-years-of-
service requirement.24 
Once retired, members are subject to three policies restricting work during retirement: 
● Retirees are not to perform any type of service, including volunteer or contract 
service, for an employer within TSERS for six months after the effective date of retirement.25 
That policy exists in part to meet the IRS requirement to ensure a separation of service 
between employer and employee before distributing retirement benefits. The IRS has not 
defined how long the separation period must be or what types of service constitute 
violations of the separation of service requirement. 
● Retirees receiving pension benefits cannot hold positions eligible to participate in 
and make contributions to the retirement systems, also called covered employment. For a 
position to qualify for membership in TSERS, the position must require at least 30 hours per 
week for at least nine months per year. 
● Retirees working for an employer participating in TSERS, including on a contractual 
basis, must earn less than a specified amount  The annual earnings limit is the larger of: 1) 
50 percent of the retirees last 12 months’ of compensation before retirement, or 2) $30,160 
in 2012, which is adjusted using the Consumer Price Index each year. If a retiree exceeds the 
limit, his or her retirement benefits are suspended for the rest of the calendar year. 
                                                          
21 Tax Consequences of Plan Disqualification, Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Tax-
Consequences-of-Plan-Disqualification, retrieved Oct. 31, 2013 
22 Section 5.01(5), Internal Revenue Bulletin 2013-4, Internal Revenue Service, Jan. 22, 2013 
23 N.C.G.S § 135-5(a) 
24 Retirement Security for N.C. Teachers and State Employees 
25 N.C.G.S. § 135-1(20) 
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Return-to-work law has become a prominent issue for the North Carolina Retirement Systems 
Division, which administers all of the state’s public employee pension plans. Several high-profile 
cases have raised the issue and caused retirement system leaders to contemplate reforms.  
For example, in one case the client’s staff often cites, a recently retired school bus driver was asked 
to return tens of thousands of dollars in pension payments because he had substituted for another 
bus driver in an emergency. He did so during the separation of service period after retirement, 
when he was not allowed to perform any services for an employer participating in the retirement 
system. Such cases not only create public relations problems for the retirement system but also 
tend to inspire litigation that is costly for the system to defend against. 
Modifying return-to-work laws holds implications for state human resource capacity, for 
retirement system finances, and for retirees and employers in the retirement systems, which are 
important constituent groups for the retirement systems’ leaders. 
Normal Retirement Age and In-Service Distributions 
IRS laws and regulations state that a plan may distribute benefits while a person is still employed, 
without a separation of service, if: 
● the beneficiary has attained normal retirement age,26 
● or the beneficiary is at least 62 years old.27 
As a result, establishing a normal retirement age relieves pension plans of the need for 
reemployment and separation of service policies to ensure compliance with § 401(a). A plan still 
might maintain reemployment restrictions to prevent rehired retirees from taking the places of 
employees who could contribute, rather than withdraw, funds to the retirement system. Normal 
retirement ages are not by definition the same as minimum retirement ages. Some states, for 
example, allow employees to retire earlier and to receive reduced retirement benefits.  
If a pension plan does establish a normal retirement age, it “must be an age that is not earlier than 
the earliest age that is reasonably representative of the typical retirement age for the industry in 
which the covered workforce is employed.”28  
Plans establish their own normal retirement ages, within IRS guidelines. A normal retirement age of 
62 years or later is considered to be in compliance. An age between 55 years and 62 years might be 
compliant depending on the facts and circumstances. Normal retirement ages of less than 55 years 
are not in compliance. However, normal retirement ages of 50 years or more are compliant for 
plans in which substantially all participants are qualified public safety employees under 26 U.S.C. § 
72(t)(10)(B).29 
                                                          
26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-1(b)(1) 
27 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(36) 
28 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-1(b)(2) 
29 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-1(b), also called the 2007 NRA regulations 
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The IRS in 2012 said it intends to revise those rules  as applied to governmental plans, such as 
TSERS, to clarify that governmental plans can but do not have to set normal retirement ages in most 
cases, so long as they do not provide in-service distributions before age 62.30 
Peer-State Policies 
State policies for retirement ages and retiree reemployment vary significantly in their details, but 
most have two basic components: A minimum age at which a person can retire with full pension 
benefits, and a requirement to have been employed within the pension system for a minimum 
number of years before receiving a full pension benefit. Policies often blend those two components, 
setting different requirements for years of service based on a person’s age. 
59 percent of statewide defined-benefit pension plans open to enrollment set minimum age 
requirements for retirement. 41 percent of them allow retirement at any age after 30 years of 
service, as TSERS does, or after a greater level of service.31 
Only one of North Carolina’s peer systems placed a limit on earnings of rehired retirees, as of fall 
2013.32 The Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System has an earnings limit of one 
third of the final average compensation for retirees of who return to work directly for or as a 
contractor in a Michigan public school. Retirees who go over the limit forfeit retirement benefits 
and health plan premiums until employment ceases. A law passed in 2010 removed the previous 
limit of one third of final average compensation or the Social Security earnings limit, whichever was 
greater.33 
Value of this project for return-to-work issues in North Carolina 
As the state’s human resources evolve, the North Carolina retirement systems could consider a 
number of policy changes related to retirees who return to work. Among the most significant 
changes could be to impose a normal retirement age, after which a person could begin to receive 
benefits and could work with minimal restriction, while continuing to receive a retirement check. 
The policy would obviate at least two of the three restrictions on working in retirement. Separation 
of service and reemployment policies become irrelevant when no one can retire before a certain 
age, at which they can continue to work while receiving benefits. 
I am not trying to estimate the long-term costs and benefits of a particular policy change to the 
retirement system, which the system’s actuaries do. Instead, the goal of this project is to give the 
retirement system a better understanding of what factors affect how long retirees come back to 
work for public employers, and how much they earn in doing so. 
                                                          
30 Notice 2012-29, Internal Revenue Service, April 30, 2012 
31 Fiscal Integrity H 381 Policy Brief, N.C. Retirement Systems Division, May 28, 2013 
32 I considered other systems to be peers if a state’s total pension liabilities were funded at 70 percent or 
more, and if actuarial accrued liabilities were between $30 billion and roughly $80 billion, as of 2011. The 
metrics include all pension funds within the state. Those measures for North Carolina are 95.3 percent and 
$60.9 billion. Within a state, the primary systems were chosen to be peer systems. Reference for funding 
figures: “The State of State Pension Plans,” Morningstar, November 25, 2012  




That information could help the retirement system assess the implications of a change in return to 
work policy for state human resources and for different groups of retirees. For example, if the state 
were to create a policy in which individuals can work for the state without restriction, retirees who 
work for longer and earn more could stand to benefit the most or at least be more sympathetic to a 
policy that allows them to avoid the hassle of restrictions. In addition, if certain retirees are willing 
to work for less than others, state agencies might be willing to pay a portion of retiree earnings to 
the system to offset the actuarial cost the retirement system bears when a retiree takes the place of 
an active employee. 
It is difficult to say how retirees’ behaviors might change under different circumstances and 
whether they would work more if allowed or work less if required to wait until reaching normal 
retirement age to retire in the first place. Still, a model that properly describes factors affecting 
retirees’ earnings and length of work in retirement has value, if for no other reason than to help the 
retirement system better understand that population. 
 
Data on public employee retirees who return to work in North Carolina 
The dataset and data cleaning 
The dataset began with 29,069 observations, each representing a retiree of the LGERS or 
TSERS who returned to work for the same system from which the person retired, while continuing 
to receive a benefit. The data spanned from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2013. To distinguish 
working retirees from active employees, the retirement system uses three codes: STRE, STRS and 
LOCRS. The first is for retirees exempt from the earnings limit and applies to only one individual in 
the dataset after 2010. LOCRS and STRS marks members subject to the earnings limit for retirees 
who return to work and continue to receive their benefits.34 Employers report individuals who 
return to work subject while continuing to receive benefits. Earnings reported for individuals 
receiving benefits but not categorized as LOCRS, STRS or STRE are flagged automatically in Orbit 
and corrected. It is possible that some employers fail to report retirees earning pay. 
I removed 3,179 observations with dates of return to work prior to Jan. 1, 2007. Data from 
those years were unreliable, since they pre-date the retirement system’s data management 
software, Orbit. The data were erratic, with several hundred observations marked as beginning 
work at the same time but no observations beginning work for long stretches. I removed an 
additional: 
 357 observations with no benefit amounts at the time of their return to work – 
clear errors because no person who is retired can have a benefit of zero. All of those 
                                                          
34 Teachers, under certain conditions, were exempt from the earnings limit. That exemption expired Oct. 1, 2009. 
The 2009 North Carolina General Assembly created a new exemption for certain nursing instructors in TSERS. That 
exemption expired in 2013. Source: “Significant Events Concerning the North Carolina Teachers’ and State 
Employees’ Retirement System,” North Carolina Retirement Systems Division 
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individuals also had missing values for system type, employer type, and average 
final compensation. 
 19 observations with negative values for length of time working in retirement or 
length of time from retirement to return to work. 
 275 observations with average final compensation of zero, again clear errors 
because no person eligible for a retirement benefit can have final compensation of 
zero. 
 259 additional observations with no earnings in any of the years. Since the code to 
generate the dataset was intended to capture individuals earning pay, those are 
likely errors. 
That left 24,980 observations in the analysis. 
The data do not include those who returned to work as full-time employees, and stopped 
receiving their benefits, or those who went to work for private employers and therefore were not 
subject to return-to-work laws. Having data on those individuals would allow for a model that 
estimates factors affecting the decision to return to work, when and where. Without those data, the 
models in this paper can only try to describe which factors influence how long people work in 
retirement and how much they earn from it, given that they chose to return to work for the state 
and to continue receiving their benefits. 
Dependent variables 
Earnings in retirement 
For the earnings analysis, I added annual earnings across a person’s entire period of work in 
retirement, after adjusting all figures to 2013 dollars using the U.S. GDP price deflator. I then 
calculated a person’s average weekly earnings for the period in which they worked. 
Length of work in retirement 
My dependent variable here was the number of weeks between the first day of the first pay period 
of work in retirement, and the last day of the last pay period of work in retirement. I used weeks 
because they are a precise measure, whereas months or years vary in length. A clear issue with the 
dependent variable is that the data are not able to distinguish between multiple starts and stops of 
work within a period and one continuous period of work. Because I provide the code for this 
analysis, the retirement system could re-run the analysis if its data are able to make that distinction. 
The issue is not as series as it might seem at first. Median length of work time in retirement was one 
and three-quarter years, a relatively short period. You might expect that time to be longer if many 
people were returning for a short period early on and another short period later in the analysis 
timeframe. Also, individuals who returned for different work periods under different classification 
codes – such as STRS and STRE – were marked separately, as were individuals who returned to 




As a result, this analysis only makes inferences about the total length of time between when 
someone was first marked as earning pay as a retiree and the last pay period in retirement. I 
suggest the retirement system re-run the analysis once the data improve and have provided the 
code to do so. 
Survival analysis measure the time until a specific event, in this case the end of the work period. 
Those who had not finished working as of Jan. 1, 2014 were counted as censored observations, 
meaning they were counted as not having stopped working. 
Explanatory variables 
Explanatory variables were taken from the list below. In general, I tried to use as many explanatory 
variables as possible, avoiding any clear statistical issues of perfect collinearity – when two 
variables are perfectly correlated. For example, you would not include indicator variables for each 
of the retirement system codes and would instead include only two of them, with the variable left 
out represented in the model’s constant term. 




Age at return to work  age_rtwbegin in years 
Retirement system plan 
code 
tsers, lgers, or 
stre 
STRE, STRS and LOCRS as described above 
No. days before return rtwlag Return to work begin date minus retirement date 
Agency code  employer code of agency where employed in retirement 
Average final 
compensation 
afc.weekly the average annual compensation, in 2013 dollars35, in the 
four years before retirement, defined in N.C.G.S. 135.1(5) . 
Divided by 52.17 to give a weekly figure. 
Earnings/AFC ln_diff Log(average weekly earnings in retirement / afc.weekly)  
SP500 Index sp500.lag1 Average S&P 500 stock index, average from the year prior 
to return to work 
Governmental gross state 
product 
gov_gsp.B Governmental gross state product in North Carolina, from 
the year of return to work. In billions of 2013 dollars. 
Private-sector gross state 
product 
priv_gsp.B Private-sector gross state product in North Carolina, from 
the year of return to work. In billions of 2013 dollars. 
Weekly retirement 
benefit 
ben_rtw.weekly monthly benefit amount, in 2013 dollars, at return to 
work, converted to weekly amount dividing by (30.5/7) 
Squared weekly benefit quad.ben_rtw.we
ekly 
equal to 0.0001 times ben_rtw.weekly squared. I scaled it 
down just to avoid lots of zeros in the coefficients. 
Social Security eligible socsec_any Age 62 or older at return to work, the earliest age at 
which a person can receive Social Security retirement 
benefits 36 
Medicare eligible medicare Age 65 or older at return to work, the Medicare eligibility 
standard age 
Log of monthly benefit ln_realbenefit natural log of monthly benefit amount 
School employee school indicator variable marking whether a person returned to 
work for a public school 
                                                          
35 All dollar figures from past years were adjusted for general price inflation using the U.S. G.D.P deflator published 
by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Board. The deflator is not adjusted for seasonal differences. 
36 Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm, accessed April 1, 2014 
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School employee exempt 
from earnings limit 
school.stre indicator variable marking those who worked for public 
schools and were exempt from the earnings limit. All but a 
few of the exempt employees worked in schools, so this 
indicator allows for comparison of school employees with 
and without the earnings limit. 
UNC employee unc indicator variable for retirees working for the University 
of North Carolina and its institutions 
Community College 
employee 
commcoll same, but for the state community college system 
Post-2009 Begin post09_rtwbegin Indicator = 1 for individuals who began work Jan. 1, 2010 
or later. Intended to capture effects of the recession on 
earnings. 
Nth tour as a return to 
work retiree 
nrtw marks the nth time a person has returned to work for the 
state, for individuals who changed classes or employers. 
Used as a control only. 






















Graphs and distributions of key data 
Density charts, histograms and other graphs below describe a few important variables in the data. 
Density charts and histograms show how common a certain value is in the data, with the highest 
point being the most common. 
Age at Beginning and End of Work in Retirement 
This graph shows that retirees who come back to work are not concentrated in one age range or 
another. Their ages are basically symmetric and centered around the average age of retirement -- 
62 years -- for North Carolina’s Teachers’ and State Employees’ Retirement System. 
 
 
Time Between Retirement and Return to Work 
Since state law restricts how soon retirees can return to work, you might expect a sudden spike in 
the number of people returning to work when the required waiting period has ended. Local system 
retirees must wait one month before returning, and state system retirees are required to wait six 
months.  
The graphs below do show a spike, particularly at the 7month mark, since most retirees in the 
dataset are from the state system. But the graphs also clearly show a steady trickle of retirees who 










Earnings in Retirement 
Graphs below show two forms of the dependent variable, average weekly earnings in retirement 
and its natural logarithm. Economists often use natural logarithms of wages for regression analysis 
of earnings. Doing so reduces the effect of outliers and usually makes earnings have a distribution 
that is closer to the normal distribution, a bell-shaped curve. 37 
 
 
Earnings in Retirement over Benefit 
The graphs below are plots of the key dependent variable, the log of average weekly earnings, over 
the key explanatory variable, weekly retirement benefits when the retiree returns to work. 
Different panes show that plot for different groups of individuals. For example, the first graph’s 
right-hand pane shows earnings plotted against benefit for retirees who returned to work for 
schools. 
The second graph with reddish dots shows the same information, but the variable along the x-axis 
is the squared benefit amount, as described in the table above. In both graphs, a few outliers with 
large benefit amounts are out of the picture. 
A few observations about the graphs: 
 The log of earnings increases as benefit increases, which means earnings do too. The 
relationship between earnings and benefit looks more or less linear. 
                                                          
37 Wooldridge, p 238 
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 There is a slight curvature at the bottom end of wages even when retirement benefits are 
not squared, which suggests maybe a quadratic form of the model is worth considering to 






A zoomed-in version of the previous graph: 
 
 
Length of Work Period in Retirement 
Most retirees work short periods in retirement, less than two years. The length of time retirees 
work steadily declines, as you might expect. That will be important in the survival analysis because 
it suggests that the probability a person will stop working in a given week increases with time: The 
longer you work, the more likely you are to quit. One of the models does not allow for that kind of 
trend, while others do. The spike near the end of the distribution comes from the fact that 
individuals who worked the entire period without quitting were given lengths at the maximum 




Earnings in Retirement 
Least-squares regression analysis is the most plain regression model used in economics and 
statistics. It calculates a straight line relating the characteristics of the observations with the 
dependent variable, in a way that minimizes the sum of the squared differences between the 
observed values of the dependent variable and the model-fitted values. Least-squares regression is 
often used to model earnings as a function of a person’s attributes, and that is what I do here. 
Model Assumptions 
I rely on the fact that my sample size is large, at 24,980, to use the large-sample properties of least-
squares analysis. With large sample sizes, criteria for when least-squares analysis will give good 
estimates of the relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables are that:38 
1. The true relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
is linear. That means values of the dependent variable are the sums of explanatory 
variables times some multiplicative factor, called a coefficient. If you were to graph 
that relationship, it would give a straight line. A linear relationship does not rule out 
either type of variable taking an exponential form, and often the relationship 
between the variables becomes more linear when one is a logarithm or a power of 
the original variable. 
 
                                                          
38 I put these criteria in roughly general terms for the sake of making them understandable. For exact definitions of 
the criteria, see appendix two and Hayash , p 109. Hayashi  was the main reference for these criteria. 
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2.  The data are a random sample of the population. The population in this project is 
the group of retirees who returned to work, while continuing to receive retirement 
benefits, for employers in the system from which they retired. The dataset 
essentially represents the population itself and so meets this criterion. The dataset 
likely would not be a random sample of all public retirees in North Carolina because 
it includes only those who chose to come back to work for the state. Those people 
might be different than retirees who choose not to work, and so I do not try to make 
inferences about retiree work habits at large. See appendix two for more 
information on this criterion, which is more complicated than it seems. 
 
3. The expected values of the error terms and each of the explanatory variables is zero. 
This assumption is sometimes described as the orthogonality assumption. See 
appendix two. 
 
4. The expected value E(xx’) is nonsingular. That just means two columns of 
explanatory variables cannot perfectly predict each other. “x” here refers to a vector 
with one person’s attributes. This criterion would be violated if the regression 
included 0-1 indicator variables for each of the three retirement types. Since a 
person must have one of the retirement class types, knowing two of them means 
you can perfectly predict the value of the other. That is why the regressions below, 
and the survival regressions, always leave out one of the retirement system types 
from the regression. 
 
5. The expected value of E((ex)(ex)’) is nonsingular, where e is the model error term 
for an individual and x is a vector of that individual’s characteristics. The apostrophe 
means the transpose of the vector. Another way to say this would be that the 
expected values of the error terms conditional on the explanatory variables is zero. 
This assumption is similar conceptually to assumption three but it is more strict, 
and this description is a simplification. 
If all five of those assumptions hold, the model’s estimated effects of the data on the dependent 
variable can be expected to have a normal, meaning bell-shaped, distribution as the sample size 
gets very large. That allows for estimating whether the estimated effects are significantly different 
from zero, which is what I want to know. 
The conditions above are in general terms. See appendix two for technical details and some 
justification for why I believe these data meet the criteria. Also see appendix two for what it means 
to have a “good” estimator. 
 
 
Model Specification and Choice 
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I chose models by first verifying each of the assumptions listed above. The model meets assumption 
four if I choose explanatory variables that do not perfectly predict each other, so I do not test for it 
explicitly. In order, my selection criteria included the following tests: 
a. Test of functional form misspecification using a RESET test. See appendix two and 
Wooldridge (2006), p 308 for details. This test re-estimates the model with squared 
and cubed versions of the original model’s fitted values, as a general test of whether 
the explanatory variables have a significant non-linear effect on the dependent 
variable. 
b. Regression errors (residuals) centered at zero. Graphical assessment and 
calculation of the average. 
c. Residual covariance is zero for all x-variables and plots of residuals do not show any 
obvious patterns, other than a random scatter around zero. Criteria b. and c. 
together suggest assumption three holds, but they do not make for an explicit test. 
See appendix two. 39 
d. Adjusted R-squared value comparison for non-nested models. F-test for nested 
models. A nested pair of models would be the case in which one model is the same 
as the other model except for added explanatory variables. For example, models one 
and four are nested because model four is model one with the square of age added 
and nothing else changed. 
Model Dependent Variable Explanatory Variables 
One log(Average Earnings) ben_rtw.weekly, ben_rtw.weekly:school, 
ben_rtw.weekly:school.stre, school.stre, tsers, 
age_rtwbegin, rtwlag, sp500.lag1, priv_gsp.B, gov_gsp.B, 
unc, comcol, nrtw, medicare, socsec_any, 
post09_rtwbegin, active, afc.weekly 
Two Average Earnings same as one 
Three log(Average Earnings) same as one, except benefit variables are in log form 
Four log(Average Earnings) same as one, except with an added variable 
age_rtwbegin^2 
Five log(Average Earnings) same as four, but all benefit values are replaced with 
squared values for the interaction terms and there is an 
additional squared benefit term on its own 
Six Average Earnings same as four 
*Note the symbol “:” signifies an interaction between two variables, meaning one variable is 
multiplied by the other and the interaction is treated as a different variable. The interactions in 
models above allow benefit amount to affect school and non-school employees differently. 
 
 
Steps A, B and C 
                                                          
39 Hayashi , p. 9 and 111. 
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All models passed the RESET test, meaning there was no obvious functional form misspecification.40 
All model residuals had average values very close to zero, and scatter plots showed they were 
centered and symmetric around zero with a slight skew toward more negative residuals. That held 
when plotting residuals with the fitted values of the dependent variable and for different important 
groups, such as those who were school employees and exempt from earnings limits. Examples of 
those kinds of plot for model five are below. Though the residuals for school and exempt employees 
are clearly shifted to the right, that is because fitted values for those employees are larger, not 
because the residuals themselves show a trend. Some residuals peek downward, but those are few 
relative to the mass centered around zero. 
 
 
                                                          





The “q-q plot” above shows how well the residuals match a standard normal distribution. The 
residuals distribution is heavier at the negative end. But unlike for smaller samples, large samples 
do not require the residuals to have a standard normal distribution to make valid inferences about 
the relationships between explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The residuals need 
only be centered at zero and orthogonal to the explanatory variables to make valid inferences about 
the least-squares estimated coefficients.41 
Based on steps A, B and C, there was no clear reason to rule out any of the models. 
Step D 
R-squared is a measure of how well the model fits the data. The more of the variation in the 
dependent variable a model can explain, the bigger its R-squared statistic. Adjusted R-squared 
measures account for the fact that models with more variables will explain more of the variation, 
just because they have more explanatory variables. A model does not need to explain all or even a 
large part of the variation in the dependent variable to estimate the relationships between variables 
accurately.42 
All of the models with a logged dependent variable had similar adjusted R-squared statistics, from 
0.19 to 0.20. Models with the unlogged dependent variable had much lower adjusted R-squared 
values, around 0.05. That clearly indicated models with a logged dependent variable fit the data 
                                                          
41 Hayashi, p 109 
42 Wooldridge, p 208 
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better. Often, economic analyses use the log of wages as dependent variables in regressions, so that 
result is not very surprising. 
R-squared values for the models with logged dependent variables were close enough to be of no 
help in distinguishing among them. Since model one was nested in model four, I used an F-test to 
determine whether model four’s additional squared age variable added enough explanatory power 
to make model four and model one significantly different. The F-test showed no significant 
difference between the two models, so I dropped model four in favor of the simpler one. See 
appendix three for my calculations. 
Ultimately I chose to present information for models one and five, which included quadratic terms 
for benefit amounts and age. I did so for to give two different models to estimate the effect of 
retirement benefits on earnings in retirement. Model one describes a straight-line relationship, and 
model five describes a curved relationship. The two led to similar conclusions, and I had no good 
reason to choose between them. I include results in appendix one for both models one and model 
five. 
Regardless, models one, three, four and five all showed similar relationships between benefit 
amount and the dependent variable. If the models gave incompatible results, my choice of model 
would matter more the results.  
Results: Earnings in Retirement 
My results suggest that, on average, retirees were willing to work for less the more they received in 
benefits, controlling for compensation at retirement and other factors. Again, you could interpret 
that to mean retirees with more years of service were willing to work for less in retirement. See the 
note above. However, in one of the two final models I found the opposite relationship for retirees 
who returned to work in public schools. 
Controlling for the other factors in the model, I estimated: 
 Retirees who work for their former systems while continuing to earn their benefits do seem 
willing to work for less, as their benefits get larger. 
 For example: A 1-percent increase in weekly benefit amount at return to work  was related 
to an 0.08 percent decrease in earnings during retirement, for non-school, non-exempt 
retirees with average fitted values and average benefit amounts. Again, that holds constant 
a person’s pre-retirement compensation. 
 Retirees with higher pre-retirement compensation I estimated to have higher earnings 
when they returned to work, holding constant all other factors, which makes sense. 
 For non-exempt school employees, I estimated the relationship between earnings and 
benefit amount to be positive in one model. See below for details. 
 In the model that allowed the effect of benefit amount on earnings to be different depending 
on the size of the benefit, the effect grew stronger for retirees with larger benefits. 
31 
 
I report estimated effects of retirement benefit amount on earnings in terms of elasticities: The 
percent change in the dependent variable you would expect to see from a one-percent change in the 
benefit amount at return to work, controlling for all other factors in the model. Since I am ultimately 
interested in earnings, not its logarithm, I first transform to logged dependent variable into its fitted 
un-logged form. See appendix two for details. In the paragraphs below I call unlogged earnings the 
“fitted value”. 
Results below come from two models, one in which benefit amount was included in the model as a 
squared variable and one in which it was not.  Including benefit as a quadratic function allows the 
change in earnings from a unit change in benefit amount to be different depending on how much a 
person makes. I included both results because both made it through the series of criteria I set up to 
evaluate the models. The two models both estimate that earnings in retirement decrease as 
retirement benefit increases for non-school, non-exempt retirees. The models differ in their 
estimated effects for retirees who fall into those groups. 
The table below reports elasticities from models one and five. Since both models included 
interaction terms with 0-1 indicator variables for retirees working in schools, the effect of benefit 
on the ratio of earnings to final compensation changes depending on whether a retiree fits in that 
group. 
 





Model Means 25th pctl 75th pctl 99th pctl Means Means  
1 -0.08152 NA NA NA -0.08078 -0.08222  
5 -0.03301 -0.00247 -0.07231 -0.38146 0.040773 0.030832  
Full regression results for both models are in appendix one. The important difference between the models is 
that model one has no exponential variables: The relationship is a straight line. Model five has benefit amount 
included as a quadratic. See the second part of this paper for details. 
 
Model one in the first graph instead shows a slightly downward sloping line. Model two in the 
second graph illustrates how the quadratic model characterizes the relationship between benefit 
amount and earnings in retirement. Note that the graphs do not give the same numbers as the ones 
in the table above. The table above gives percent changes for percent changes. The graphs below 











Implications: Earnings in Retirement 
As I said above, one of the most common policy options to offset costs related to easing work 
restrictions for retirees is to impose a surcharge for employers on the value of a retiree’s earnings. 
These results suggest such a policy could be workable for retirees with larger benefit amounts. The 
results also suggest it might be worth considering placing valuing the surcharge based on a 
worker’s retirement benefit, as opposed their earnings. Rehired retirees with larger benefits would 
ultimately earn less under that kind of policy, since employers likely would incorporate the cost of 
the surcharge into the wages they offer. But if they are willing to work for less, retirees might not be 
turned off by the lower wages. 
My estimates suggest there might be an opposite effect for retirees who worked in schools. For 
those employees, one model estimated earnings in retirement increased as benefits increased. If 
that relationship were true, an explanation might be that teachers with long experience could be in 
high demand, allowing them to command higher wages when they return to work. 
Limitations and Discussion 
Non-constant error variance 
A common issue to watch out for in linear regression is that the variance of the error terms is not 
the same for all observations. That means the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are 
skewed and might create falsely significant estimates. In large samples, you can correct for that 
inconsistency using a so-called robust estimate of the error variance in the model. I did so using the 
White “sandwich” estimator. See appendix two for the equation and appendix three for my code to 
calculate it.  
None of the significance levels of the coefficients changed much when using robust standard errors, 
so I do not report them. 
Bias from employees exempt from the earnings limit 
I worried that employees who were exempt from the earnings limit would bias the estimated 
relationships for other explanatory variables. As another check, I re-ran the model without the 
observations for individuals who worked in schools and were exempt from the earnings limit. The 
relationships in my results above did not change much at all. Results from this modified regression 
are in appendix one. 
Years of service proxy variable 
The three North Carolina retirement systems in this dataset are defined benefit plans, so a person’s 
retirement allowance is a product of years of service, average final compensation, and a small 
constant factor of around 0.0185. That factor depends on the retirement system and has changed 
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little over the years. Retirees who do not reach 30 years of service, in most cases, have a reduced 
benefit amount that does not follow the formula above.43 
Since final compensation is controlled for in the regression, another way to interpret the effect of 
benefit is that it captures the effect of years of service as member of the retirement system. I stick 
with the benefit variable because I did not have years of service in the dataset and chose not to 
include a proxy variable for it in my final models. I did not want it to appear that I was fabricating 
data. I did create a proxy variable for years of service and included it in the two final models, 
replacing compensation and benefit, to see how much that mattered. It didn’t, much, but that is not 
surprising because it is just one of the replaced variables times the other. Full results are in 
appendix one. 
You could choose to think of the results below as capturing the effect of years of service, as opposed 
to benefit amount. The important points to remember are that: 1) You can’t separate the effect of 
years of service as opposed to benefit on earnings. 2) Not having years of service in the regression 
does not necessarily bias the results, because information about years of service is embedded in the 
variable for benefit, with no additional random effects after controlling for final compensation. It 
would be better, however, if the retirement system were to get an actual measure of years of 
service and include it in the model. The difference between my proxy variable and actual years of 
service would come from individuals who retired with reduced benefits. 
Length of Time Working in Retirement 
Model Specification and Choice 
This section is an overview of the concepts behind the models and the variables used to construct 
each one. See appendix two for the mathematical forms of the most important models for this 
analysis.  
Survival models describe the time between events or the time leading up to a first event. For these 
data, survival models would describe the likelihood of working a certain amount of time before 
quitting. Survival models are rooted in the idea that for each unit of time, there is some probability 
a retiree will quit working.44 
Survival models can be applied to many problems. Amemiya (1985), ch. 11, gives several examples 
of economics papers in which survival models like the ones in this paper are used to model lengths 
of time in employment or unemployment before quitting. For example, Amemiya says Heckman and 
Borjas (1980) used a Weibull distribution to model periods of unemployment. The Weibull is the 
one I ultimately use for this paper’s results. 
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Each of the models used here assumes that the outcome variables are independently and identically 
distributed random variables, conditional on the data. For example, the probability that a person 
with a set of characteristics works a number of months in retirement does not change based on how 
long another person with the same characteristics works in retirement. It also means the same 
function will describe the probabilities of time in retirement for people in the dataset. 
As with linear regression analysis, the model includes coefficients that interact with values of a 
person’s characteristics. For example, there is a coefficient that describes how being a school 
employee influences the length of time a person works in retirement. The model chooses 
coefficients that maximize the model’s likelihood function. In other words, it chooses relationships 
among a person’s characteristics and the length of time in work that maximizes the probability a 
person with those characteristics would work that length of time. A model that perfectly described 
that relationship would have give a probability of one. 
Probabilities are small numbers, particularly when multiplied across thousands of observations, so 
the model instead maximizes the natural logarithm of the likelihood function. The log of a tiny 
number, say .001, would be a large negative number. A perfect fit would give a log-likelihood of 
zero. In the log-likelihood results below, numbers closer to zero represent a better model fit. 
Each of the models I tested assumes the effect of a person’s characteristics is to increase or 
decrease the probability of working a particular amount of time. For example, it might estimate the 
probability of a non-school employee works 52 weeks before quitting is the same as the probability 
of a school employee working twice that long before quitting. In equation form: 
𝑆𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 (𝑡) = 𝑆𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝛿𝑡) 
where S(t) is the probability of surviving at least to a particular time before quitting, and 𝛿 is a 
number that describes how being a school employee affects that probability.45 
That relationship is an assumption. If the true relationship between those two probabilities is 
exponential, for example, then the model will not describe the effect of being a school employee on 
work time in retirement very accurately.  
See appendix two for specific functions and other math related to the models. 
Model Selection 
I tested models fitting six different types of models, shown in the table below. Model types refer to 
the form of the likelihood function and other functions that it assumes to describe work times in 
retirement. The log-likelihood statistic is the same as the one described in the section above. A log-
likelihood closer to zero means the model fits the data better. In all models, the dependent variable 
was the length of time working in retirement, in weeks. 
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Model Type Log-Likelihood Explanatory Variables (see above for reference) 
Exponential  ln_diff, ln_diff_ben, school, school.stre, unc, comcol, tsers, 
sp500.lag1, rtwlag, priv_gsp.B, gov_gsp.B, 
post09_rtwbegin, nrtw (control only), medicare, 
socsec_any 
Weibull  same  
Logistic  same 
Log-Logistic  same 
Log-Normal  same 
Normal  same 
Selection Process 
I used the following process to evaluate model fit:46 
1. I compared model log-likelihood statistics for different types of models using the same 
explanatory variables, as shown above. Models with similar log-likelihood statistics fit 
the data essentially equally. 
 
2. Among the best-fitting models, I evaluated the distributional assumptions and chose 
the model for which those assumptions were most consistent with the data. For 
example, the exponential model assumes the instantaneous probability a person stops 
working is the same no matter how long that person has been working. 
 
3. For the chosen model type, I tested different forms of the explanatory variables. For 
example, I checked whether the log of benefit amount or the squared benefit amount 
was a better fit in describing the lengths of time retirees worked. 
Step One 
Only the normal and logistic models were clearly worse than other models. I kept the exponential, 
Weibull and log-normal models for further comparison. 
Step Two: Exponential and Weibull 
Exponential and Weibull survival models assume all individuals have the same baseline 
instantaneous probability of quitting work at a given period of time, called the baseline hazard.47 A 
simple way to get a sense of whether that assumption holds is to graph log(-log(S(t))) for two 
different groups of retirees, where S(t) is the Kaplan-Meier estimate of a retiree’s probability of 
working at least t weeks without quitting. See two for more information and appendix three for the 
specific calculations. 
The important things to know are that if the model is a good fit, the line for one group of retirees 
will be parallel to the line for the second group of retirees, and both lines will be straight. 
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The graphs below show a few things: 
 the exponential and Weibull models seem appropriate for describing how long most 
different types of individuals in the dataset work in retirement. 
 
 the models are not at all appropriate for individuals who work less than a month or so. The 
x-axes give values of the natural logarithm of weeks worked in retirement. Zero on the x-
axes means one week of work in retirement before quitting, since the log of one is zero. 
Individuals who worked less than about 5 weeks – whose log is 2 – have very non-linear 
points on these graphs. About 1,500 people worked 5 weeks or less in the dataset – a small 
but not insignificant number. I come back to this later and re-estimate a model without 
those observations to see how much they matter. 
 
 the models’ assumptions of proportionality do not hold when comparing individuals who 













If the straight line in the has a slope of one, the exponential model is a good fit, and it means the 
probability a retiree quits working at any given time is the same no matter how long they have 
already worked. If the straight line has a different slope, it suggests the probability a retiree quits 
working in a given week changes depending on how many weeks he or she has worked up to that 
point. A Weibull model would fit better, in that case. 
The graphs suggest a Weibull model fits better than the exponential one, since I set the dotted lines 
to have slopes of slightly less than one. 
There is another way to test whether an exponential or Weibull model fits better. The Weibull 
regression estimates the slope of the line as a matter of course and tests whether it is significantly 
different from one. Again, if the slope were one, the exponential model would fit better. The Weibull 
regression estimated a slope of 0.937, which was significantly different from one at significance less 
than p=0.0001, again suggesting the Weibull model fits better than the exponential. 
I ruled out the exponential model for those reasons. 
Step Two: Log-logistic and Weibull 
To choose between the log-logistic and Weibull distributions, I used another set of graphical tests. 
The first plots the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates of the Cox-Snell residuals. Those 
names mean nothing outside of the context of survival analysis, but the important thing to know is 
that if a model fits well the graphs should follow straight lines. See appendix two for details. 
40 
 
I made those plots for the log-logistic and Weibull models. Both were basically the same. Neither 
had a perfectly straight line, and that is OK. Often models will have curves that bend one way or the 
other toward the right-hand side of the graph.48 But this graph does not help eliminate one model 
or the other. 
 
 
As with the Weibull and exponential models, the log-logistic model has a basic assumption: It 
assumes that the ratio the probability of working at least a certain length to the probability of 
working less than that is constant for all lengths of time. For example, if you are twice as likely to 
work at least one year as you are to quit before one year, then you must also be twice as likely to 
work at least two years as you are to quit before two years. You can test that assumption using a 
graph, and the assumption holds if the lines for two groups are straight and parallel.49 
The graph’s curve along the right side indicates the log-logistic model’s assumptions don’t hold up 
as well as the Weibull model’s does, based on the graphs above. For that reason, I chose the Weibull 
model – one of the most common models used in survival analysis. 
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Reason for not testing Cox proportional hazards model 
Readers familiar with survival analysis might wonder why I didn’t choose to test a common model, 
called the Cox proportional hazards model. The reason I didn’t is that the Cox model does not allow 
for an intuitive interpretation of how a person’s characteristics affect how long he or she will work 
in retirement. Unlike the models above, the Cox model does not allow you to interpret the effect of 
retirees’ characteristics on their probabilities of working at least particular length of time in 
retirement. As the name suggests, the Cox model primarily is designed to compare hazard functions 
– the instantaneous probabilities of an event occurring. The Cox model makes fewer assumptions 
than the models above. Since the Weibull model’s assumptions hold pretty well in this case, and its 
results have a more meaningful interpretation, I avoided the Cox model altogether. 
 
Step Three: Choosing Forms of Explanatory Variables 
After finding a Weibull model to work best, the question was whether I should include different 
forms of explanatory variables. For example, should the retirement benefit amount be included in 
the model as a logarithm or not? One way to test that is to plot the deviance residuals of different 
models over the observed characteristics, times the model coefficients. The details are in appendix 
two, but the important thing to know is that a better model will have a graph that looks more or less 
like a random scatter around zero. 
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I tested seven Weibull models with different forms of benefit amount and age in the explanatory 
variables. Model A is the one with the explanatory variables listed in the model selection table, 
above. It turned out to be the one with that performed best on this test, as well. 
Graphs below show that models with benefit or age in quadratic form led to skewed deviance 
residuals. In each graph, I plot a random scatter of normally distributed data with a mean of zero 
for the sake of comparison. Details about which mixes of explanatory variables I used are in the 












Model A and model B are similar and much less skewed than model F. Model F’s large spike in the 
middle suggests the functional form of the explanatory variables is off. Other models had deviance 
residual plots that looked similar to  F’s and I chose not to include them. The only difference 
between model A and model B is that model B includes age at the time a person quit working as an 
explanatory variable. I worried about including that variable. The Medicare and Social Security 
variables both are tied to a person’s age when they start working. Together with the dependent 
variable, length of work in retirement, they very closely predict the age of a person at the end of 
retirement. To avoid such problems, I chose model A. Also, model A did not have the large outlier 
model B did, at the far right-hand side of the graph, suggesting model A was a slightly better fit.  
 
Results: Length of Time Working in Retirement 
Full results tables are in appendix one. The intuitive interpretation of the results is in terms of 
acceleration factors – the proportion by which retirees’ expected probability of working a certain 
amount of time grows or shrinks based on their characteristics. Estimated acceleration factors are 
below: 
Variable Acceleration Factor Estimate 
ln_diff +0.22  1.013889585 
school  2.431862558 
tsers  0.437434483 
unc  2.60429882 
comcol  2.415769925 
sp500.lag1 +10  0.986351574 
priv_gsp.B +10  0.725654147 
gov_gsp.B +10  1.200688737 
rtwlag + 1yr  0.99530679 
post09_rtwbegin  0.575566766 
socsec_any  0.843742198 
 
An acceleration factor greater than one increases the amount of time a person in retirement might 
be expected to work. An acceleration factor less than one decreases that time.50 The plus signs refer 
to how large an increase in the variable the acceleration factor is calculated for. For example, a 
retiree who begins working in a year where the private gross state product is $10 billion more 
would have a probability of working only two thirds the amount of time than a retiree who begins 
working without that increase in gross state product. 
I did not include factors for coefficients that were not significantly different from zero. See appendix 
one for the full results. 
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The results make common sense, and I interpret them this way: 
 A larger ratio of earnings in retirement to compensation before retirement extends the time 
a person works in retirement, as shown in the coefficient for ln_diff, controlling for the other 
factors. 
 Retirees who worked in schools could be expected to work two and a half times longer than 
those who did not work in schools. Working at a university or community college had a 
similar effect. 
 Retirees from TSERS who were not university, school, or community college employees 
could be expected to work only half the time an LGERS retiree works. 
 More economic activity in the private sector is related to shorter work times. One 
explanation might be that retirees or their spouses are able to find better-paying work in 
the private sector when private sector output is higher, pulling them away from work for 
public employees. 
 Retirees who started working Jan. 1, 2010 or later could be expected to work just about half 
the time of employees who started working before then, all else equal. That effect is 
estimated while controlling for the fact that some retirees before 2010 were exempt from 
the earnings limit. 
 Being eligible for social security benefits also shortened the time a retiree might be 
expected to work, though since age itself is not controlled for in this model it’s unclear 
whether that effect is because of age or because of social security benefits themselves. 
Limitations of Results 
It is clear from the graphs in step two, above, that the results probably do not do a good job 
describing factors influencing how long certain groups of retirees work. Those who work less than 
a month or so have different survival curves, which this model doesn’t fit very well. The same is 
true for school employees who were exempt from the earnings limit. Therefore I do not include an 
acceleration factor for that group in the results above.  
The question is whether those aberrations bias the results for other groups. I re-estimated the 
model twice, once without retirees who were exempt from the earnings and limit and who were not 
school employees, and again without retirees who worked less than a month before quitting. 
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